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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

WHAT CAN A RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR DO?
By

STANLEY

V.

KINYON*-

T has been said that natural streams exist by the bounty of

Providence for the benefit of the lands through which they
flow.' Be that as it may, the fact remains that riparian proprietors
on such streams who desire to avail themselves of that benefit often
find confusion and contradiction in the law as to their rights and
privileges. Perhaps this is due to the inherent elusiveness of flowing water and the difficulty of applying accepted legal concepts
to situations in which it is involved. Perhaps it is due more to
a misunderstanding of fundamental principles, or to a lack of
agreement among the courts as to the policy which the law ought
to follow in respect to water resources. Whatever the source of
this confusion, it might well be said:
"Unblessed is the riparian proprietor, for he knows
not where he stands."
In many cases one finds statements to the effect that there
is no ownership of flowing water-that riparian proprietors have
"no property in the water itself, but a simple use of it while it
passes along."2 Such statements lead only to confusion since it is
not apparent in what sense the terms "ownership" and "property"
are used. What do you mean when you say that one ons something or has property in it? A volume could be written on that
question alone. In the opinion of some authorities, ownership
or the having of property in a thing merely means that one has an
indefinite number of rights, powers, privileges and immunities in
respect to it.3 In other words, one who has a right to the exclu*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. Much of the
material upon which this article is based was gathered and developed by the
writer in connection with his work as research assistant for Dean Everett
Fraser of the University of Minnesota Law School, Reporter for the Restatement of the Law of Property of the American Law Institute.
'Story, J., in Tyler v. Wilkinson, (C.C. R.I. 1827) 4 Mason 397, Fed.

Cas. No. 14,312.

2
Tyler v. Wilkinson, (C.C.R.I. 1827) 4 Mason 397, Fed. Cas. No.
14,312, at p. 474. See also Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 6 Exch. 353, 20 L. J.

Ex. 212; 3 Kent, Comm. 439; Wiel, Running Water, (1908)

22 Harv. L.

Rev. 190.
3
Thus it was said in Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, (1921)
298 Ill. 394, 131 N. E. 645: "Property itself, in a legal sense, is nothing
more than the exclusive right of possessing, enjoying and disposing of a
thing which of course, includes the use of a thing." And again: "According
to these definitions of property there is no such thing as tangible property or
corporeal property." In 1924 the Illinois court again had occasion to re-
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sive possession of a thing, or the privilege of using, occupying or
enjoying it, or the power to dispose of it, or a combination of
these and others, owns or has property in it. If this opinion is
sound, then the statement that there can be no ownership of, or
property in, flowing water is misleading, since it is uniformly
admitted that under the common law 4 riparian proprietors on a

watercourse do have rights, powers and privileges in respect to
the use, appropriation and enjoyment of the flowing water. Perhaps these rights, powers and privileges are not as absolute' or
unqualified as one's rights, powers and privileges in respect to
other things, but they arise out of the possession of riparian land,'
7
and are recognized and protected as property.
mark, in Shedd v. Patterson, (1924) 312 Ill. 371, 144 N. E. 5, that "In the

law 'property' is not the material object itself but the right and interest
which one has in it to the exclusion of others." In McInnes v. McKay,
(1928) 127 Me. 110, 141 At. 699, the court said: "Property in legal conception is the total of rights and powers incident to a thing rather than the
thing itself." See also the Restatement of the Law of Property, ch, I, Introductory Note.
4A number of Western states have never adopted the common law
principles of riparian rights, while others have partially or wholly repudiated them. A list of these states is to be found in Mr. Wiel's recent
article, Fifty Years of Water Law, (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 252, 259.
5It is interesting to note that Blackstone, in speaking of such things
as air and water, used this language: "A man can have no absolute pernnent [italics added] property in these, as he may in the earth and land
since these are of a vague and fugitive nature." Bl. Com., Book II, ch.
XXV, P. 395. And in Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Ferris, (C.C. Nev. 1872)
2 Sawy. 176, Fed. Case No. 14,371, p. 601, it was said: "All have a usufruct;
none have any absolute [italics added] property in the water, . . . ." In
McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Ati.
489, the court said at page 707: "Such water [in lakes and streams] in its
na'ural state (so far as respects private ownership thereof) is not personal,
but real property, being as much a part of the land itself as the soil and
rocks. In this aspect it is viewed by the common law, which holds that
he who owns the soil owns all above it and all beneath it But in view
of the transient and flowing nature of water, the landowner's property
therein is not absolute but qualified. In a sense he owns it while it is upon
his land, but his ownership is limited to a usufructuary interest, without
right to divert any from its natural course, saving for the limited uses that
"
naturally
and of necessity pertain to a riparian owner ....
0
"His rights are not easements or appurtenances to his holdings. They
are not the rights acquired by appropriation or by prescriptive use. They
are attached to the soil and pass with it." Hargrave v. Cook, (1895)
108 Cal. 72, 41 Pac. 18, 30 L. R. A. 390. Similar statements are to be
found in Elliott v. Fitchburg R. R., (1852) 10 Cush. (Mass.) 191; Benton v.
Johncox, (1897) 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 496; Union Mill & Min. Co. v.
Dangberg, (C.C. Nev. 1877) 81 Fed. 73; Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76 Vt.
240, 56 Atl. 1106.
7
Under eminent domain proceedings: St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes,
(1882) 62 Cal. 182, 45 Am. Rep. 659; Rumsey v. New York & N. E. R.R.,
(1892) 133 N. Y. 79, 30 N. E. 654; Bigelow v. Draper, (1896) 6 N.D. 152,
69 N. W. 570; State v. Korrer, (1916) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617; State
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What is the nature of these property rights and privileges
which a riparian proprietor has in respect to the flowing water on
his land? Are they different from other rights and privileges
in respect to the use of land and the things on or in it? It is
often asserted that riparian proprietors have "equal rights" in the
use and enjoyment of the watercourse.8 What is meant by that?
Does it mean that every proprietor has an equal privilege to do
what he pleases with the water while it is on his land? Does
it mean that each is entitled to take the same quantity of water
from the stream that each of the others takes? Does it mean
that each has an equal right to have the stream continue flowing
through his land unaffected by the acts of others? Or does it
mean that all proprietors have equal privileges and equal rights
in the use and enjoyment of the stream irrespective of who makes
the first use? One cannot be sure just what each court has meant
by its assertion that riparian proprietors have "equal rights," and
it is quite certain that they have not all meant the same thing
by it. One wonders if they do not, in general, mean this: (1)
no proprietor has a better or greater privilege to use the water
than has any other, irrespective of who made the first use; and
(2) each proprietor is entitled to the same legal protection in his
use of the water as is accorded every other proprietor. If this
be the correct interpretation of "equal rights" as applied to riparian
proprietors, the phrase simply means that the law recognizes no
priorities or preferences among them and that it accords to
each man the same freedom and protection in the use of his property that it accords to every other man.
It is also asserted that the rights and privileges of riparian
proprietors are correlative, not absolute. 9 In other words, a prov. Bancroft, (1912) 148 Wis. 124, 134 N. W. 330.
For tax purposes: San Francisco v. Alameda County, (1936) 5 Cal.
(2d) 243, 54 P. (2d) 462.
sTyler v. Wilkinson, (C.C. R.I. 1827) 4 Mason 397, Fed. Cas. No.
14,312; Meng v. Coffee, (1903) 67 Neb. 500, 93 N. W. 713; Turner v.
James Canal Co., (1909) 155 Cal. 82, 99 Pac. 520; Hayes v. Waldron,
(1863) 44 N. H. 580; Gehlen v. Knorr, (1897) 101 Iowa 700, 70 N. W.
757; Davis v. Town of Harrisonburg, (1914) 116 Va. 864, 83 S. E. 401.
The term "rights" apparently is used in most of the cases to mean
both one's legal freedom to act (privilege) and one's legal claims in respect
to the acts of others (rights). Keeping the term "rights" to its narrower
meaning, and using the term "privileges" when speaking of a riparian
proprietor's legal freedom to use water is a definite aid to clear thinking
in dealing with the legal relations of riparian proprietors.
9
Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76 Vt. 240, 56 AtI. 1106; Katz v. Walkinshaw,
(1903) 141 Cal. 116, 99 Am. St. Rep. 35, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766; Bassett v.
Salisbury Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569. In Lawrie v. Silsby, it is said at page

WHAT CAN A RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR DOf

prietor is not absolutely free to do as he pleases with the water in
the stream, but must have regard for the interests of the other
proprietors. His privileges of use are qualified by the rights of
the others, and their privileges of use are, in turn, qualified by
his rights. In a sense, rights and privileges are not strictly
correlative in the way that rights and duties are correlative.
Privileges qualify rights or rights qualify privileges, 10 depending
on which way you look at the matter. But with this in mind it
is perhaps permissible to speak of the rights and privileges of
riparian proprietors as correlative. It has sometimes been thought
that this principle of correlative rights and privileges is something
unique and applicable only to the law of riparian rights. Such is
not the case. Every landowner, in using his land, must have
regard for his neighbor.11 If I own land, I am generally considered as being legally free to use it as I see fit. Nevertheless,
my neighbor's recognized rights limit my privileges of use and
subject me to liability if I blast on my land so as to bring his
house down,' or dig in my land so that his land subsides, 13 or
operate my factory so that noxious fumes from my chimney destroy his trees and flowers. 4 Likewise, my (equal) rights operate
as a limitation on his privileges in using his land, and give me a
cause of action if his use is tortious in respect to me. Our rights
and privileges are correlative, not absolute.
One physical fact, however, gives the principle of correlative
rights and privileges a peculiar and added significance when applied
to flowing water. That is the fact that flowing water is fugitive,
not stationary. Soil, rocks, trees, houses, and the like normally
stay in one place. A use of them, by the owner of the land where
252: "But the logical result from the correlative rights of riparian proprietors would seem to be that each must use his own right so as not to deprive
the others of an equal enjoyment of their same rights."
"J"As between different proprietors on the same stream, the right of
each qualifics [italics added] that -of the other ..... " Cooley, J., in Dumont
v. Kellogg, (1874) 29 Mich. 420, 18 Am. Rep. 102.
"This idea is often expressed in the maxim: "Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas" use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that
of another. But consider the remarks of Erle, J., in Bonomi v. Backhouse,
(1858) El. Bl. & El., 96 Eng. Com. L. Rep. 622, 641: "The maxim, Sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, is mere verbiage. A party may damage
the property of another where the law permits; and he may not where the
law prohibits: so that the maxim can never be applied till the law is
ascertained; and, when it is, the maxim is superfluous."
"2Hakkila v. Old Colony, etc., Co., (1928) 264 Mass. 447, 162 N. E. 895.
13Gilmore v. Driscoll, (1877) 122 Mass. 199.
'4St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, (1863) 4 B. & S. 608, 11 H. L. C.
642; Bohan v. Gas Co., (1890) 122 N. Y. 18, 25 N. E. 246, 9 L. R. A. 711.
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they are, sometimes affects his neighbor in some way; but such
use does not ordinarily deprive the neighbor of the soil, rocks,
trees, etc., on his land. Water, on the other hand, does not stay
put. It has the urge to roam and, unless confined or frozen, flows
from one parcel of land to another. It is not susceptible, in its
natural state, of permanent division into separate tracts or plots.
Each particle of water successively occupies the lands of all the
proprietors on the watercourse. Consequently, any extensive use
of water by one proprietor while it is on his land may not only
affect his neighboring proprietor, but may actually deprive him
of water which would otherwise come to his land. Although
riparian proprietors on a stream are not tenants in common as
that term is generally used, they have a common interest in the
stream. This fact increases the regard which they must have
for each other's interests. In a sense perhaps, it intensifies the
correlative character of their rights and privileges. Riparian proprietors are necessarily more restricted in what they can do with
water than in what they can do with other things on their land,
but that does not mean that use of water and use of other
things are governed by different principles of law. It simply
means that the effects of the different uses on others are different,
and that the principle of correlative rights and privileges imposes
greater restrictions on one use than on another.
Assuming that riparian proprietors have "equal rights," whatever that may mean, and that their rights and privileges are correlative, there is still to be considered the extent of these rights
and privileges. What rules or principles have the courts adopted in
determining the extent of the individual rights and privileges of
each proprietor? What facts must exist before one proprietor
can be heard to complain of another's use? When does one proprietor's use cease to be within his privilege and constitute an
invasion of another's right? It is in trying to answer these questions that the courts have met with their greatest difficulty. In
discussing them it should be observed that no question of public
rights and privileges in respect to navigation and public use of
waters is involved. We are dealing with the rights and privileges
of riparian proprietors inter se. It should further be noted that
the discussion involves only those rights and privileges which
riparian proprietors have by virtue of the fact that they possess
riparian land, and does not involve rights and privileges arising
by grant, prescription or eminent domain.
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THE "NATURAL

FLOW" IDEA

"Aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat." "Water
flows, and ought to flow as it has been wont to flow."'" This is
the touchstone or philosophy which a number of courts have
adopted in framing their rules as to the extent of individual
riparian rights and privileges. The idea seems to be that God
made streams and put them on land, and that when man acquires
that land he also acquires, by the law of nature (jure naturae),
the right to have the streams continue flowing in their natural
quantity and quality. According to this view each riparian proprietor on a watercourse is regarded as having a right that the
stream continue to flow over and through his land in its natural
condition, undiminished and unpolluted by others.1 6 This right,
however, is not wholly unqualified since, if it were, the proprietor
at the mouth of the stream would be the only one to have any
substantial privilege of using it. All others would be limited
to those uses which did not affect the natural flow or quality
of the stream in any way. Thus the courts which adopt this
view of riparian rights hold that each proprietor's right to the
natural flow of the stream is qualified by certain limited privileges of use in the others.

The first and greatest of these privileges is the privilege to
make "natural" or domestic uses. 17 What could be more natural
153 Kent, Comm. 439. Chancellor Kent's language in reference to this
maxim was quoted in full by Baron Parke in the classic English case of
Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 6 Exch. 353, 20 L. J. Ex. 212, and has since been
referred to in many cases.
"'Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts, etc., Co., (1874) L. R. 9 Ch. App.
451, L. R. 7 H. L. 697; McCartney v. Londonderry, etc., Ry. Co., [1904]
A. C. 301; Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C. Maine 1838) 3 Sumner 189,
3 Law Rep. 374; Robertson v. Arnold, (1936) 182 Ga. 664, 186 S. E. 806;
Roberts v. Martin, (1913) 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535; Exton v. Glen
Gardner Water Co., (1925) 3 N. J. Misc. Rep. 613, 129 Atl. 255; Stein v.
Burden, (1856) 29 Ala. 127; Clark v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1891) 145 Pa.
St. 438, 22 Atl. 989.
' 7 The earliest case the writer has found in which this privilege is
mentioned is Perkins v. Dow, (1793) 1 Root (Conn.) 535. The two cases
most frequently cited are Miner v. Gilmore, (1858) 12 Moore, P. C. 131;
and Evans v. Merriweather, (1842) 4 Ill. 492. Other cases are cited in
footnote 18. The courts have not been in entire agreement as to what are
and what are not "natural" or domestic uses of water. Thus in City of
Canton v. Shock, (1902) 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N. E. 600, it is apparently held
that diversion of water by the city for the use of its inhabitants is a
"natural" use. And in Filbert v. Dechert, (1903) 22 Pa. Sup. 362, a
diversion of water to supply the needs of some 800 inmates of an asylum
located on the banks of the stream was held to be a domestic use. On the
other hand it was definitely held in City of Emporia v. Soden, (1881) 25
Kan. 410. that supplying the inhabitants of a city located on the banks of a
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than a natural privilege qualifying a natural right? Although
it is often said that this privilege is unqualified and that a proprietor can use water for his "natural" or domestic purposes even
though he thereby consume the whole stream, 18 it has been suggested that his use must not be wasteful or unnecessarily extensive. 19
In addition to his privilege to make "natural" uses, each proprietor is regarded under this view as having a limited privilege
to make "artificial" or "extraordinary" (i..e., non-domestic) uses
of water for such purposes as irrigation, manufacturing, generation of power and the like.2 0 One limitation on this privilege is
the requirement that the use be made on or in connection with
the use of the proprietor's riparian land. 21 Another limitation on
this privilege to make non-domestic uses is the requirement that
they must not cause "any interruption of or interference with
stream was not a domestic or "natural" use. In some of the early cases in
the semi-arid western states it was argued that use of water for irrigation
was a "natural" or domestic use. See Rhodes v. Whitehead, (1863) 27
Tex. 304. But this argument has not been adopted. See Stacy v. Delery,
(1909) 57 Tex. Civ. App. 242, 122 S. W. 300.
IsCanton v. Shock, (1902) 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N. E. 600; Spence v.
McDonough, (1889) 77 Iowa 460, 42 N. W. 371; and Filbert v. Dechert,
(1903) 22 Pa. Super. 362, seem to be the only cases in which this proposition
has actually been held. The statements in Miner v. Gilmore and Evans v.
Merriweather, (Supra, footnote 17) were obiter as were the statements
in the following cases: Stein v. Burden, (1856) 29 Ala. 127; Ferrea v. Knipe,
(1865) 28 Cal. 341; Arnold v. Foote, (1834) 12 Wend. (N.Y.) 330; Hazeltine v. Case, (1879) 46 Wis. 391, 1 N. W. 66; Nielson v. Sponer, (1907)
46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155; Chatfield v. Wilson, (1858) 31 Vt. 358; People
v. Hulbert, (1902) 131 Mich. 156, 91 N. W. 211.
19Wiggins v. Muscupiabe etc. Co., (1896) 113 Cal. 182, 45 Pac. 160;
Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co., (1891) 74 Md. 269, 13 L. R. A. 117.
20
Arnold v. Foote, (1834) 12 Wend. (N.Y.) 330; Chatfield v. Wilson,
(1858) 31 Vt. 358; Evans v. Merriweather, (1842) 4 Ill.
492; Miner v.
Gilmore, (1858) 12 Moore, P. C. 131; Prentice v. Geiger, (1878) 74 N. Y.
341; Nielson v. Sponer, (1907) 46 Wash. 14, 89 Pac. 155; Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Miller, (1886) 112 Pa. St. 34, 3 At. 780; Watkins Land Co. v.
Clements, (1905) 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733. These are some of the leading cases which make a distinction between domestic and non-domestic
uses. There are many more. See the opinion of Pound, J., in Meng v.
Coffee, (1903) 67 Neb. 500, 93 N. W. 713, for a discussion of the basis
of this classification of uses.
21
Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts & Berks Canal Nay. Co., (1875)
L. R. 9 Ch. App. 451, L. R. 7 H. L. 697; Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries
[1926] 1 Ch. 444; Ulbrict v. Eufaula Water Co., (1888) 86 Ala. 587, 6
So. 78; Exton v. Glen Gardner Water Co., (1925) 3 N. J. Misc. 613, 129

Atl. 255; Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, (1903) 67 Neb. 325, 93 N. W. 781;
Lord v. Water Co., (1890)

135 Pa. St. 122, 19 Atl. 1007; Standen v. New

Rochelle Water Co., (1895) 91 Hun. 272, 36 N. Y. S.92; Gould v. Eaton,
(1897) 117 Cal. 539, 49 Pac. 577; Duckworth v. Watsonville Water Co.,
(1907) 150 Cal. 520, 110 Pac. 927.
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the rights of the lower riparian owner. ' 22 It does not clearly
appear in the cases exactly what is meant by this requirement, but,
since the right of other proprietors is to have the stream flow in
its natural condition, it would seem that the privilege extends
only to those non-domestic uses which do not materially or unreasonably retard, diminish or pollute the natural flow of the
stream.23 What constitutes a material or unreasonable retardation,
diminution or pollution is not entirely clear. In some jurisdictions
any perceptible or noticeable effect on the stream seems to be
regarded as material and unreasonable, while in others a more
24
substantial effect seems to be necessary.
In those jurisdictions which adopt this "right to the natural
flow" view of riparian rights and privileges, the situation would
seem to be this:
(1) Each riparian proprietor on the watercourse has a right
in respect to the other proprietors thereon that the stream continue to flow through his land in its natural condition, not perceptibly25 retarded, diminished or polluted except by the privileged
uses of the others. Or, to put it another way, each proprietor
has a right that the others shall not make unprivileged uses which
perceptibly affect the stream.
(2) Each riparian proprietor on the watercourse has a privilege in respect to the other proprietors thereon to use the water
for his own domestic ("natural") purposes, and for such non22
The phrase quoted in the text is taken from the following passage
in Pennsylvania R. R. v. Miller, (1886) 112 Pa. St. 34, 41, 3 AtI. 780,
"The principle established by a long line of decisions is that the upper
riparian owner has the right to the use of the stream on his land for any
legal purpose, provided he returns it to its channel uncorrupted and without

any essential diminution; that in all such cases the size and capacity of the
stream is to be considered and that any interruption of or interference with
the rights of the lower riparian ozwwr [italics added] is an injury for which

an action
will lie, unless too trifling for the law to notice."
2
3CIark v. Pennsylvania R. R. (1891) 145 Pa. St. 438, 22 At. 989
(material and sensible diminution); Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C.
Maine 1838) 3 Sumner 189, 3 Law Rep. 374 (material diminution) ; Evans
v. Merriweather, (1842) 4 Ili. 492 (unreasonable diminution); Miner v.
Gilmore, (1858) 12 Moore 131 (sensible injury) ; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co.,
(1900)
24 164 N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142 (sensible alteration in quality).
1n

many of the more recent cases it is not clear whether the court

is talking about unreasonable diminution of the "natural flow" or unreasonable use under the "reasonable use" doctrine discussed below. See for
example the opinions in Meng v. Coffee, (1903) 67 Neb. 500, 93 N. W.

713; and Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, (1930) 111 Conn. 352, 150
Ati. 260.
5
In Kensit v. Great Eastern Ry., (1883) L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 566, L. R_
27 Ch. Div. 122, the court held that although defendant was making a wholly

unprivileged (non-riparian) use, he was not liable because his use had no
sensible or perceptible effect on the stream.
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domestic purposes on or in connection with the use of his riparian
land as do not materially or unreasonably retard, diminish or
pollute the natural flow of the stream.
This "natural flow" principle of riparian rights and privileges
leads to the following results:
(a) An unprivileged use of water-a "non-riparian" use,
for example-which perceptibly affects the natural flow of the
stream on another's land, violates that other's right and is actionable by him even though it interferes with no use that he is making
26

and causes him no harm whatsoever.

(b) The cause of action arises at the time the natural flow
is affected by the unprivileged use, and the period of prescription
27
starts running from that time.

(c) If the unprivileged use is continuous or recurrent, an
injunction may properly be granted to prevent the acquisition of
a prescriptive privilege even though no harm has been caused. 8
(d) Since his privilege of use is limited to uses made on or in
connection with the use of the riparian land, a riparian proprietor
cannot create in a non-riparian a privilege of use which will be
valid as against other proprietors. 9 In other words, he cannot
26

Swindon Waterworks Co. v. Wilts & Berks Canal Nay. Co., (1875)
L. R. 9 Ch. App. 451, L. R. 7 H. L. 697; Roberts v. Gwyrfai etc., [1899]
1 Ch. 583; McCartney v. Londonderry, etc., Ry. Co., [1904] App. Cas. 301;
Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries, [1926] 1 Ch. 444; Harvey Realty Co. v.
Wallingford, (1930) 111 Conn. 352, 150 Atl. 60; Robertson v. Arnold,
(1936) 182 Ga. 664, 186 S. E. 806; Exton v. Glen Gardner Water Co.,
(1925) 3 N. J. Misc. 613, 129 Atl. 255; Clark v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1891)
145 Pa. St. 438, 22 AtI. 989; Roberts v. Martin, (1913) 72 W. Va. 92, 77
S. E. 535; Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C. Maine 1838) 3 Sumner 189,
3 Law
2 Rep. 374.
The best discussion of this point is found in Half Moon Bay Co. v.
Cowell, (1916) 173 Cal. 543, 160 Pac. 675; and Pabst v. Finmand, (1922)
190 Cal. 124, 211 Pac. 11, in connection with the court's discussion of nonriparian uses. The present state of the law in California on this point is
discussed in footnote 54.
28Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C. Maine 1838) 3 Sumner 189, 3
Law Rep. 374; Ulbrict v. Eufaula Water Co., (1889) 86 Ala. 587, 6 So. 78;
Exton v. Glen Gardner Water Co. (1925) 3 N. J. Misc. 613, 129 Atl. 255.
29
Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, (1864) 3 H. & C. 300; Ormerod
v. Todmorden Mill Co., (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 155; Harvey Realty Co. v.
Wallingford, (1930) 111 Conn. 352, 150 Atl. 60; Hendrix v. Roberts
Marble Co., (1932) 175 Ga. 389, 165 S. E. 223; Roberts v. Martin, (1913)
72 W. Va. 92, 77 S. E. 535; Gould v. Eaton, (1897) 111 Cal. 639, 117 Cal.
539, 49 Pac. 577. A series of California decisions following a dictum in
Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, (1907) 150 Cal. 327, 88 Pac. 978,
established the anomalous rule that when a part of a tract of riparian land
not in contact with the stream is severed by conveyance from the rest of
the tract, the grantee of this severed parcel will get riparian rights and
privileges in the stream if the conveyance expressly so provides, but not
otherwise. Strong v. Baldwin, (1908) 154 Cal. 150, 97 Pac. 178; Miller &
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grant a normal easement or profit in the use of the stream good as
against third persons unless the grantee limits his use under such
grant to the grantor's riparian land."
This "natural flow" theory or principle of riparian rights, which
may have had its origin in French or Civil Law, was first expounded
in this country by Justice Story and Chancellor Kent; and it has
been pointed out that their views were subsequently adopted by
the English courts.-" Whatever may be its origin and history, it
is the basis of the present law of riparian rights in England,3and has a substantial following in this country.3 3 Even in jurisdictions which, in actual result, do not adopt this theory of the
law, cases can be found which echo and re-echo the classic language
in which Story and Kent expressed their opinions. In fact, this
parrot-like tendency of some courts to quote passages from leading
cases without due regard for the real significance of the language
quoted has undoubtedly led to much of the confusion in the law.
This "natural flow" view has the practical advantage of being
Lux v. J. G. James Co., (1919) 179 Cal. 689, 178 Pac. 716. The recent

constitutional amendment in California relating to water rights, discussed
in footnote 54 infra, undoubtedly affects the rule of Gould v. Eaton (supra)
but does not necessarily affect this anomalous situation.
3eDuckworth v. Watsonville Water Co., (1907) 150 Cal. 520, 110 Pac.
927. In discussing the non-riparian plaintiff's rights under the conveyance,
the court said at page 526: "Grimmer [the riparian grantor] could not by a
transfer of his riparian rights sell to the plaintiff, as against third persons
having interests in the water, the right to use the water upon any land,
riparian or non-riparian, except his own, to which it originally attached.
His deed operated to prevent him from complaining of a diversion, but it did
not affect other parties. It follows therefore, that Duckworth [the plaintiff]
did not obtain anything by the Grimmer deed except the right to use the
water of the outlet upon the Grimmer land [italics added] .... It did not
in any respect add to his right to take water from the land for use on the
Duckworth land, as against the defendants [other proprietors], or as against
anyone except Grimmer and his successors in interest."
3lWiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, (1919) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 133. Mr. Wiel develops the idea that our present American and
English law had its origin in the writings of Story and Kent, and that they,
in turn, probably got many of their ideas from the French and Civil Law
with which they were well acquainted.
3"See the English cases in footnotes 26 and 29.
33
The American cases cited in note 26 represent the jurisdictions in
which this view is definitely followed at the present time. The cases in
many other jurisdictions do not clearly indicate what view is adopted. See,
for example, the following New York cases: Garwood v. New York Cent.
& H. R. R. (1881) 83 N. Y. 400; Standen v. New Rochelle Water Co.,
(1895) 91 Hun 272, 36 N. Y. S.92; Gray v. Village of Ft. Plain, (1905)
105 App. Div. 215, 94 N. Y. S.698; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., (1900) 164
N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142; Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., (1913) 208
N. Y. 1, 101 N. E. 805; McCann v. Chasm Powder Co., (1914) 211 N. Y.
301, 105 N. E. 416; Howland v. Union Bag & Paper Corp., (1935) 156
Misc. Rep. 507, 282 N. Y. S.357.
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fairly definite in some of its legal consequences. Under it, each
riparian proprietor can know within certain limits what he can
and cannot do with the water on his land. A serious objection
to this view, however, is that it is non-utilitarian in objective. It
prohibits many beneficial, non-harmful uses simply because they
materially diminish or pollute the natural flow of water. It permits a riparian proprietor to play "dog in the manger," not
using the water himself but insisting that his neighbor above
refrain from making a valuable use of it.
THE "REASONABLE USE" IDEA

In some jurisdictions a fundamentally different view or principle of riparian rights and privileges prevails. This is the socalled "reasonable use" view. The idea underlying this view is
that natural streams exist primarily for the use and benefit of
mankind, not merely to be maintained in their natural state. This
view emphasizes the riparian proprietor's privilege of use rather
than his right to have the stream flow in any particular way. Each
proprietor is regarded as having a privilege to use the water for
any3" beneficial purpose, provided such use is reasoniable in respect
to the other proprietors on the stream, and does not unreasonably
interfere with their beneficial uses. Reasonable use is the sole
measure or test of riparian privileges, 35 and, since a use cannot be
said to be unreasonable in respect to another unless it causes him
some harm or inconvenience, a use is always privileged when it
causes no harm."
34
"The fundamental principle upon which the authorities all go is this:
That every proprietor of land through or by which a stream of water flows,
may make a reasonable use of it for any [italics added] useful purpose."
Union Mill & Min. Co. v. Ferris, (C.C. Nev. 1872) 2 Saw. 176, Fed. Cas.
No. 14,371.
35"But the logical result from the correlative rights of riparian proprietors would seem to be that each must use his own right so as not to
deprive the others of an equal enjoyment of their same rights. [citations]
It would seem to follow that reasonable use is the only limit that can be
set to the exercise of these rights [italics added]. This is the rule in New
Hampshire, where they repudiate the English doctrine, and hold it to be
a question of fact whether the use of the water made by a riparian owner
for his own purposes is, in all the circumstances, a reasonable use." Lawrie
v. Silsby, (1904) 76 Vt. 240, 252, 56 Atl. 1106. See also Bassett v. Salisbury,
(1862) 43 N. H. 569; Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, (1883) 30 Minn.
249, 15 N. W. 167.
a6That the plaintiff, to recover, must show actual damage or harm as
a result of defendant's use of the stream has been held in the following
cases: Cooper v. Hall, (1832) 5 Ohio 321; McElroy v. Gable, (1856) 6
Ohio St. 187; Elliott v. Fitchburg R. R., (1852) 10 Cush. (Mass.) 191;
Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, (1913) 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E.
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The determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of a use under this view is generally regarded as a question of
fact' 7 to be determined by court or jury in each particular case
on the facts of that case." It is a question to be determined from
an objective standpoint, taking into consideration the interests of
both parties and also the interests of the community." The question is not whether the use is reasonable from the user's point of
view, but whether, in view of the consequences of the use, it is
one which reasonable men generally would regard as proper
87, 49 L. R. A. (N.S.) 57; Parsons v. Tennessee Coal etc. Co., (1914) 186

Ala. 84, 64 So. 591; Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, (1933) 217 Cal. 673,

22 P. (2d) 5; Valparaiso City Water Co. v. Dickover, (1897) 17 Ind.
App. 233; Baldwin v. Ohio Township, (1904) 70 Kan. 102, 78 Pac. 424;
Dumont v. Kellogg, (1874) 29 Mich. 420, 18 Am. Rep. 102; Meyers v.
Lafayette Club, (Minn. 1936) 266 N. W. 861; Concord Mfg. Co. v.
Robertson, (1889) 66 N. H. 1, 25 Atl. 718; Jones v. Conn, (1901) 39 Or.
30, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac. 1068; Dyer v. Cranston Print Works, (1901) 22
R. I. 506, 48 AtI. 791; Garrett v. McKie, (1845) 1 Rich. (S.C.) 444; Chalk
v. McAlily, (1857) 11 Rich. (S.C.) 153; Texas Co. v. Burkett, (1927) 117
Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273; Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76 Vt. 240, 56 Atl. 1106;
Brown v. Chase, (1923) 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23.
Some of these cases are definitely based on the theory that a use which
causes no harm is reasonable. Others are based on the theory that an
action against a riparian proprietor for wrongful use of the stream is
trespass on the case, and that actual damage to plaintiff is therefore an
essential element of his cause of action. Both theories, however, are inconsistent
with the "natural flow" and "material diminution, etc." principle.
u7When a court or jury determines that a use is reasonable or unreasonable it is, strictly speaking, drawing a conclusion from facts rather than
determining a fact. Determining unreasonableness is much like determining
negligence in this respect; and although the courts seldom do so, it would
be more accurate to say that it is a mixed question of law and fact. See
Cason v. Florida Power Co., (1917) 74 Fla. 1, 76 So. 535 (case involving
use of subterranean water and the application of the principle of "reasonable
use" 3thereto).
8Snow v. Parsons, (1856) 28 Vt. 459; Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76
Vt. 240, 56 Atl. 1106; Hayes v. Waldron, (1863) 44 N. H. 580; Union Mill
& lin. Co. v. Ferris, (C.C. Nev. 1872) 2 Saw. 176, Fed Cas. No. 14,371;
Dumont v. Kellogg, (1874) 29 Mich. 420, 18 Am. Rep. 102; Red River
Roller Mills. v. Wright, (1883) 30 Minn. 249, 15 N. W. 167; Gehlen v.
Knorr, (1897) 101 Iowa 700, 70 N. W. 757, 36 L. R. A. 697; Jones v. Conn,
(1901) 39 Or. 30, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac. 1068; Half Moon Bay Co. v.
Cowell, (1916) 173 Cal. 543, 160 Pac. 675.
39"In determining what is a reasonable use, regard must be had to
the subject matter of the use; the occasion and manner of its application;
the object, extent, necessity, and duration of the use; the nature and size of
the stream; the kind of business to which it is subservient; the importance
and necessity of the use claimed by one party, and the extent of the injury
to the other party; the state of improvement of the country in regard to
mills and machinery, and the use of water as a propelling power; the
general and established usages of the country in similar cases; and all the
other and ever varying circumstances of each particular case, bearing upon
the question of the fitness and propriety of the use of the water under consideration." Mitchell, J., in Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, (1883) 30
Minn. 249, 253, 15 N. W. 167. See also the other cases cited in footnote 38.
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under the circumstances. 0 Determining reasonableness is thus
essentially an evaluating and weighing process. On one side of
the scales, figuratively speaking, is the utility or total objective
value of the use complained of. This is determined from a consideration of such facts as the social importance and necessity
of the use, its purpose, its extent in view of the size of the
stream and the needs of others, the manner in which it is being
made, and its suitability to the size and character of the stream.
On the other side of the scales is the gravity or objective seriousness of the harm ensuing from the use. This depends upon such
facts as the amount or degree of harm, the social importance and
necessity of the interests harmed, and whether the proprietor who
is harmed could avoid the harm without much difficulty. If, in
view of all the facts, the utility or total objective value of the
use outweighs the gravity or seriousness of the harm which it
causes, the use is reasonable; otherwise it is not. 41
In those jurisdictions which adopt this "reasonable use" view
of riparian rights and privileges, the situation is apparently this:
(1) Each riparian proprietor on a watercourse has a privilege in respect to the other proprietors thereon to use the water
for any purpose he wishes, provided his use is reasonable in
respect to such other proprietors.
(2) Each riparian proprietor on a watercourse has a right
that other proprietors thereon shall not make uses of the water
which are unreasonable in respect to him. Or, to put it another
way, each proprietor has a right that the others shall not unreasonably interfere with his reasonable use of the stream.
This "reasonable use" principle leads to the following results:
(a) No proprietor has a right to have the mere natural integrity of the stream maintained.

42

(b) One is subject to no liability for making a use of water
43
unless that use causes harm to another.
40"For the purpose of ascertaining what is reasonable, both sides of
the question must be looked at. It is not sufficient to ask, is the person
who does what is complained of using his property reasonably? The question is, is he using it reasonably, having regard to the fact that he has a
neighbor?" Theobald, the Law of Land, 62.
4lThis rule is not expressly stated in any of the decided cases. It seems
to the writer, however, to be a sound conclusion from the cases cited, and
is analogous to the rule stated in 2 Restatement of Torts, sec. 291, in
respect to the unreasonableness of the risk of harm in determining negligence.
42
The cases cited in footnote 36, holding that a riparian proprietor is
not liable for using the stream unless his use causes actual damage or harm,
seem to lead to this conclusion.
4
Cases cited in footnote 36.
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(c) A use of water, whether for "riparian" or "non-riparian"
purposes, is privileged so long as it is reasonable. 4
(d) A cause of action does not arise in respect to a use until
that use causes harm and is unreasonable; and the period of pre5
scription does not start running until that time.4
(e) Since his privilege of use is not wholly limited to uses
made on or in connection with the use of the riparian land, a
riparian proprietor can make reasonable "non-riparian" uses and
can grant to non-riparians a privilege as against other proprietors
to do the same." In other words, a riparian proprietor can grant
to non-riparians a normal easement or profit in the use of the
47

stream.

This "reasonable use" theory or principle apparently was first
fully developed in New Hampshire, 48 1 Minnesota 4 and Vermont"0
2
5
Some other jurisdictions, notably California ' and Washington,r
44In a few cases the courts have made no distinction between "riparian"
and "non-riparian" uses. See Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76 Vt. 240, 56
At. 1106; Gillis v. Chase, (1892) 67 N. H. 161, 31 AtI. 18; Atchison Ry.
v. Shriver, (1917) 101 Kan. 257, 166 Pac. 519. In other cases the courts
distinguish between "riparian" and "non-riparian" uses, and hold that the
latter are unreasonable as a matter of law when they cause harm to
another. See Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, (1913) 216 Mass. 83,
103 N. E. 87; Garwood v. New York Cent. & H. R. R., (1881) 83 N. Y. 400;
Jones v. Conn, (1901) 39 Or. 30, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac. 1068; Texas Co.
v. Burkett, (1927) 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273; Brown v. Chase, (1923)
125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23. These cases are to be distinguished from
those which follow the "natural flow" doctrine and hold that a "nonriparian" use is wholly unlawful and actionable even when it causes no
harm. (See footnote 26.)
"ZDyer v. Cranston Print Works, (1901) 22 R. I. 506, 48 Atl. 791;
Joerger v. Mt. Shasta Power Co., (1932) 214 Cal. 630, 7 P. (2d) 706;
Half Moon Bay Co. v. Cowell, (1916) 173 Cal. 543, 160 Pac. 675. See also
(1936) 21 MINNES TA LAw REviEw 117.
41"Elliot v. Fitchburg R. R., (1852) 10 Cush. (Mass.) 191; St. Anthony
Water-Power Co. v. Minneapolis, (1889) 41 Minn. 270, 43 N. W. 56;
Gillis v. Chase, (1892) 67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18; Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt.
240, 56
Atl. 1106.
47
"It would seem to follow that if the right to take water from a
spring or a stream is an interest in the land itself, that such right is
grantable as a right in gross or appurtenant, and is assignable, descendable,
and devisible; and such, we think, has always been the view entertained and
practiced upon in this State."

56 At. 1106.

Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904)

76 Vt. 240, 251,

48Hayes v. Waldron, (1863) 44 N. H. 580; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg.
Co., (1862) 43 N. H. 569; Concord Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, (1889) 66
N. H.
1, 25 At. 718; Gillis v. Chase, (1892) 67 N. H. 161, 31 Atl. 18.
45
Red River Roller Mills v. Wright (1883) 30 Minn. 249, 15 N. W.
167; Pinney v. Luce, (1890) 44 Minn. 367, 46 N. W. 561; St. Anthony
Water-Power Co. v. Minneapolis, (1889) 41 Minn. 270, 43 N. W. 56;
Meyers v. Lafayette Club, (Minn. 1936) 266 N. W. 861.
' 0 Snow v. Parsons, (1856) 28 Vt. 459; Lawrie v. Silsby, (1904) 76
Vt. 240,
56 At. 1106.
5
Lux v. Haggin, (1886) 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674.
52
Benton v. Johncox, (1897) 17 Wash. 277, 49 Pac. 495.
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started out with the "natural flow" idea but sought to liberalize
it by expanding the privilege of making "extraordinary" or nondomestic uses on riparian land. Use for irrigation of riparian
land, for example, was held to be privileged although it materially
diminished the natural flow of the stream, provided such use was
reasonable under the circumstances of the case.13 However, such
jurisdictions continued until recently 54 to hold that non-riparian
uses were wholly unlawful and unprivileged. 55 In a number of
other states 8 the cases seem to be more in accord with this view
than with the "natural flow" doctrine, but the language in many
of these cases is confusing.
It has sometimes been assumed that the "natural flow" principle
is the common law principle, and that the "reasonable use" idea
is simply a modification of that principle."
Careful analysis,
however, would seem to indicate that such is not the case. Perhaps the "reasonable use" view was developed after the "natural
flow" doctrine, but it is not merely a variation of it. The two
53

Southern Cal. Investment Co. v. Wilshire, (1904) 144 Cal. 68, 77 Pac.
767; Turner v. James Canal Co., (1909) 155 Cal. 82, 99 Pac. 520; Hudson
v. Dailey, (1909) 156 Cal. 617, 105 Pac. 748; Nesalhous v. Walker, (1907)
45 Wash. 621, 88 Pac. 1023.
5
4In 1923 the supreme court of Washington in Brown v. Chase, 125
Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23, extensively reviewed its prior decisions and held
that there was no liability for non-riparian diversion unless it caused harm
to some riparian proprietor. In 1928 a constitutional amendment was passed
in California, article 14, sec. 3, which was construed by the California
supreme court in Gin S. Chow v. Santa Barbara, (1933) 217 Cal. 673, 22
P. (2d) 5, to mean that there is no liability for making a non-riparian use
of water from a stream unless that use impairs another proprietor's present
or prospective reasonable use of the stream. The Oregon Water Code,
passed in 1909, (Oregon, 3 Code Ann., sec. 47-101 et seq.), established a
comprehensive system of water appropriation and greatly restricted riparian
rights and privileges. See In Re Hood River, (1924) 114 Or. 112, 227 Pac.
1065, appeal dismissed in (1926) 273 U. S. 647, 47 Sup. Ct. 245, 71 L.
Ed. 821; California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 555, affirmed in (1934) 295 U. S. 142,
55 Sup. Ct. 725, 79 L. Ed. 1356.
55
Gould v. Eaton, (1897) 111 Cal. 639, 117 Cal. 539, 49 Pac. 577;
Rigney v. Tacoma, etc., Co., (1894) 9 Wash. 576, 38 Pac. 147.
56Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, (1913) 216 Mass. 83, 103 N. E.
87; Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover, (1925) 143 Va. 460, 130 S. E. 408;
Jones v. Conn, (1901) 39 Or. 30, 64 Pac. 855, 65 Pac. 1068; Harris v. Norfolk & Western Ry., (1910) 153 N. C. 542, 69 S. E. 623; Texas Co. v.
Burkett, (1927) 117 Tex. 16, 296 S. W. 273; Dyer v. Cranston Print
Works, (1901) 22 R. I. 506, 48 Atl. 791; McDonough v. Russell Miller
Milling Co., (1917) 38 N. D. 465, 165 N. W. 504; Atchison Ry. v. Shriver,
(1917) 101 Kan. 257, 166 Pac. 519; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., (1900) 164
N. Y. 303, 58 N. E. 142; Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper
Co., (1927) 240 Mich. 279, 215 N. W. 325; Timm v. Bear, (1871) 29
Wis. 254; Gehlen v. Knorr, (1897) 101 Iowa 700, 70 N. W. 757.
57Wiggins v. Muscupiabe, (1896) 113 Cal. 182, 45 Pac. 160; Brown v.
Chase, (1923) 125 Wash. 542, 217 Pac. 23.
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views spring from fundamentally different concepts as to what
people ought to do or refrain from doing with flowing water. They
seek to achieve different ends. One view emphasizes the right to
the flow of the stream, and seeks to maintain, as nearly as possible, the status quo of nature. The other emphasizes the privilege
of use, and seeks to promote the fullest beneficial use of streams
by the proprietors thereon.
Those who adopt the "natural flow" principle apparently look
at the situation from the standpoint of the stream itself, regarding it as a mystical, non-owned unit in the "negative community" 581
of things, which must be maintained in substantially its natural
state and used only for certain traditionally important purposes.
The "natural flow" idea finds its source in natural law philosophy. It assumes that the law should follow nature and that
each proprietor on a stream has and should have the right to have
the stream continue flowing in substantially its natural state through
his land. Is this a sound assumption? Should we strive, through
the law, to maintain the natural order of things as nearly as
possible; or should we strive to change that natural order to suit
the social and economic order we desire to establish? Do we, in
other branches of the law dealing with the conflicting interests of
neighboring landowners, assume that each landowner has and
should have the right to compel his neighbor to maintain the
natural order of things? Do I, for example, have any right that
you, my neighbor, shall not plow up the field of wild flowers on
your land whose delightful natural perfume is wafted to me on
each natural breeze? Or do we assume that each landowner has
the privilege to develop, use, and enjoy his land as he sees fit, so
long as he does not unreasonably interfere with his neighbor in
the exercise of his equal privilege to do likewise?
Those who adopt the "reasonable use" principle, apparently look
at the situation, not from the standpoint of the stream itself, but
from the standpoint of the individual proprietors through whose
land the stream passes. They regard the stream as an unfixed,
transitory part of the land of each proprietor to be'used by him,
just like any other part of his land, with due regard for the interests of his neighbor.
The "reasonable use" idea is entirely utilitarian in its objective. It places no restraint on beneficial use for any purpose unless that use unreasonably harms another. Its very flexibility
makes it adaptable to all sorts of uses in all manner of situations,
58See Wiel, Running Water, (1908) 22 Harv. L. Rev. 190.
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and permits the solution of each particular case on its own merits
under the particular circumstances. It is a principle under which
conflicts between riparian proprietors in any locality can be settled
according to the standard of the objective reasonable man.
It may be argued that to measure riparian rights and privileges
solely on the principle of "reasonable use" is to abandon the determination of individual property rights and privileges to the
whim and caprice of juries. If the power of courts to direct, control and set aside verdicts is taken into account, this is true. What
then? Are not a great majority of our personal and property
rights and privileges determined in the same way under the principles of the law of negligence? Aside from intentional harms
and malicious or ultra-hazardous conduct, do we not generally
apply to most acts the standard of "reasonable conduct under the
circumstances" in determining rights and privileges in respect to
person or property?
There are few, if any, "thou shalts" or "thou shalt nots" under
the "reasonable use" doctrine. Under it the riparian proprietor
knows only that what he does with the water on his land must be
reasonable in respect to other proprietors. His only guide is his
sense of fairness and consideration for others. This may, perhaps, be intolerable to those who desire specificity in the law, but it
seems to be the situation in an increasing number of jurisdictions.

